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ISSUES PRESENTED IN VIEW OF STATE'S RESPONSE 
I. Whether the amendments to LC. § 18-915 made in 2011 were meant as mere 
surplusage. 
II. Whether the state legislature defined duties for sheriffs and the Idaho State Police by 
statute but intended municipal police to have their duties defined by either the 
common law of 19th Century England or the definitional section of the Peace Officer 
Standards and Training Council Chapter of the Idaho Code. 




The state argues in its response that the reason the defendant is incorrect about the 
requirement that the duties alleged in the information need to be specified and proven is because the 
duties of the officer are not an element of the offense. Rather, that language is apparently surplusage, 
and proof that an officer is an officer and was struck for being an officer is not only a means of 
violating LC. § 18-915, but the only means. 1 
First, this is rather problematic considering the District Court essentially granted the 
defendant's Motion for a Direct Verdict as to that manner of violating LC.§ 18-915 and thus it does 
not appear in the jury instruction on the elements. See Jury Instruction 11; Tr. p. 90, L. 7-25, p. 91, L. 
1-25, p. 93, L. 1-17, p. 94, L. 13-16. Thus, if the state is correct, the defendant should have been 
acquitted. 
Second, the Idaho Supreme Court has been insistent since State v. Folk, 151 Idaho 327 
(2011), just as the United States Supreme Court has insisted since Aaron Burr was charged with 
treason in 1807, that the charging instrument cannot contain language that would allow a person to 
be found guilty on a basis that does not exist in the law. See Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. 75 (1807). So 
were the state to be correct that LC. § 18-915 does not require anything to be shown or proved as to 
whether the defendant struck a police officer "[b ]ecause of the exercise of official duty .. " or"[ w ]hile 
1 The state appears to concede that it must prove an officer was engaged in his duties in some cases, but provides no 
explanation of what that would mean. Thus, the state's position could be read in the alternative to mean that a defendant 
can violate LC. 18-915 by striking a police officer who was engaged in her duties, but that the state need not actually 
prove anything as regards those duties. That reading makes surplusage of the "because of his official status" language in 
the statute, and also would most certainly violate the notice requirement of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Art. I § 13 of the Idaho Constitution. However, the state clearly does 
not take that view of the statute either. See State's Brief at 10-12. Thus the state appears to admit that in this case there 
was no showing that the officer was engaged in any duties, and that therefore the District Court erred in not granting the 
- 2 -
the victim [was] engaged in the performance of his duties .. ", then that language must be left out, both 
of the charging document and the instruction, so as not to create the danger that the defendant would 
be convicted on those grounds, rather than those the state contends make up the actual crime. And 
then, this Court would have to reverse the conviction because the charging document and the 
instruction would allow for the defendant to have been convicted without actually breaking the law. 
Folk, 151 Idaho at 342. 
Finally, prior to the adoption of the United States Constitution, Alexander Hamilton 
convinced John Jay and James Madison to publish a series of essays in New York now commonly 
known as the Federalist Papers. The essay now known as No. 41 and written by Madison contains 
the following rejection of the idea of surplusage in legal texts: 
If the different parts of the same instrument ought to be so expounded, as to give 
meaning to every part which will bear it, shall one part of the same sentence be 
excluded altogether from a share in the meaning; and shall the more doubtful and 
indefinite terms be retained in their full extent, and the clear and precise expressions 
be denied any signification whatsoever? 
The same objection to such readings was adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Sturgis v. 
Crowninshield, 17 U.S. 122,202 (1819). The Idaho Supreme Court recognized therulethatastatute 
must be read to give effect.to all the words therein in State v. Alkire, 79 Idaho 334, 344 (1957) citing 
Adams v. Lansdon, 18 Idaho 483 (1910); State ex rel. Frenzel v. Wyoming State Board of Examiners, 
74 P.2d 343 (Wyo. 1937). 
Thus, the state's reading of I. C. § 18-915 cannot be correct. From the format of the statute to 
the absurdity of reading as without effect words with plain meaning, this Court cannot hold that LC. 
§ 18-915 does not require a showing of whatever duties it is the officer is allegedly engaged in at the 
Motion for Directed Verdict as to that manner of violating the statute. See State's Brief at 5-6. 
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time of the battery. Those duties should appear in the charging document, the instruction for the 
jury, and in this case should require a reversal for their conspicuous absence. 
II. 
The state argued in its response that LC. § 18-915 is not void for vagueness and goes on to 
argue that the word duties must be in reference to their definition as provided by statute and case law. 
The defendant agrees with the first part of this analysis but continues to disagree that the judiciary 
has the power to define the duties of police officers. The state provided no argument or explanation 
as to where the judiciary gained the power to dictate the duties of executive officers. It seems to 
simply rely on cases that, also without explanation, claim that power for the judiciary. As the 
defendant has already explained why that is unconstitutional and the state has provided no further 
argument on the subject, the defendant will simply refer this Court to his argument on pages 20 and 
21 of his original brief. 
The state makes, however, an attempt to give some hope to the prosecutor on remand by 
providing two possible sources of duties for a police officer working for the city of Coeur d'Alene. 
First, the state argues that LC.§ 19-5101 confers duties on municipal officers. Essentially, the state 
is arguing that the legislature defined the duties of municipal officers in 1981 when it created the 
Peace Officer Standards and Training Council. Further, the state argues it did so by defining the 
word "peace officer" as an employee of a police force of a political subdivision "whose duties 
include and primarily consists of the prevention and detection of crime and the enforcement of penal, 
traffic or highway laws of this state or any political subdivision." LC.§ 19-5101 cannot confer 
duties by defining peace officers as those with particular duties. The duties were clearly already in 
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existence prior to LC. § 19-5101, else statute would be referring to no one at all. Cf LC. § 31-
( defining duties sheriffs 1864). 
Second, the state argues that a municipalities police officers have duties as defined by the 
common law per LC.§ 73-116. In other words, the state argues that the people of the state when 
they adopted Art. XII § 2 of the Idaho Constitution, or the legislature when it adopted LC. § 50-201 
et seq. in 1967, had intended that municipalities would be granted the power to create their own 
peace officers whose duties would be dictated by English common law. Meanwhile, the legislature 
of the Idaho Territory had already defined the duties of county sheriffs in 1864, the same year it 
adopted LC.§ 73-116. See Terr. Sess. 1864, p. 475, §§ 3-6; Terr. Sess. 1864, p. 527, § 1. Even were 
such a thing remotely believable, the state forgets that LC. § 73-116 does not adopt the English 
common law as the law of the land. Rather, the law simply adopts it as the "rule of decision in all 
courts of this state." That is a rather far cry from adopting English common law duties for municipal 
police officers. 
The state's arguments fail, and thus, this Court should reverse the defendant's conviction and 
dismiss this matter. 
III. 
The state argues in its response that the defendant may be correct that the Court instruction on 
voluntary intoxication was incorrect and LC. § 18-116 may be unconstitutional to the extent that the 
state is relieved of the burden to prove an element of the crime. However, the state insists that LC.§ 
18-915 has no specific intent requirement, and therefore the District Court should be affirmed. To 
get to this understanding of LC. § 18-915, the state backtracks to simple battery as defined by LC. 
18-903, then state continues on explaining that under LC. 18-915 the defendant has to intend to strike 
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an "because he was an officer or while was performing his at an " 2 See 
at 1 16. The state then claims it 
The state's argument is somewhat confusing, but appears to stem from the understanding of 
specific intent as a requirement of intending a result as stated in State v. Rolon, 146 Idaho 684, 691 
(Ct.App. 2008): 
A general criminal intent requirement is satisfied if it is shown that the defendant 
knowingly performed the proscribed acts, but a specific intent requirement refers to 
the state of mind which in part defines the crime and is an element thereof. In other 
words, specific intent requires not only the doing of an act, but the performance of 
that act with the intent to cause the proscribed result. 
citing State v. Fox, 124 Idaho 924, 926 (1993). While the Court of Appeals began with the 
understanding at common law of the difference between specific and generally intent, it then creates 
a narrower category of intent for a particular purpose. This is understandable: the distinction 
between specific intent, or intent in general, and purpose or motive has long been a bone of 
contention among lawyers,judges, and legal scholars. See Elain M. Chiu, The Challenge of Motive 
in the Criminal Law, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 653 (2005); Major Edith M. Rob, A Question of 
"Intent" - Intent and Motive Distinguished, AUG ARMY LAW 27 (1994); Rollin M. Perkins, A 
Rationale of Mens Rea, 52 HARV. L. REv. 905, 921 (1939). As Professor Chiu of St. John's 
University School of Law describes it: 
Some have defined motive as completely different from intent while others have 
argued that motive is a particular type or sub-category of intent. Still others, like 
Douglas Husak, have offered more functional definitions. The first group regards 
intentions as "cognitive states of mind, like expectations or perceptions of risk" while 
describing motives as "desiderative states," meaning "desires, purposes or ends." In 
other words, "motives explain why a person acted, while intentions describe what 
action was performed." While appealingly simple, this definition renders the maxim 
2 Again, the state forgets that the District Court acquitted the defendant of the former. 
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of irrelevance untrue. It is untrue that the criminal law never vv,J,.,,...,."'' 
acts determining liability. 
at 664 (footnotes 
why a person 
In Idaho, it appears that the Court accepted "motive," as in LC. § 18-915, as a 
subcategory of specific intent. Thus, one will find that the Idaho Court of Appeals found that 
aggravated assault on an officer was a specific intent crime in State v. Boehner, 114 Idaho 311, 314 
(Ct.App.1988) ("the prosecutor was required to prove Boehner's state of mind-that is, a specific 
intent to shoot a police officer"); see, also, State v. J\1cBride, 123 Idaho 263, 265 (Ct.App.1992) 
(referring to perjury as a specific intent crime); State v. Hall, 111 Idaho 827, 834 (Ct.App.1986) 
(referring to malice aforethought in a second degree murder case as specific intent); State v. De La 
Paz, 106 Idaho 924, 926 (Ct.App.1984) (same). One also finds that the original LC. 18-116 
specifically permitted intoxication to negate "any particular purpose [or] motive." State v. Lopez, l 26 
Idaho 831, 833 (1995). 
So while the state's objection to the defendant's use of the term "specific intent" may be 
correct semantically, at least in some quarters, the question remains for this Court as to whether 
voluntary intoxication must be allowed to provide a defense against the existence of a mental 
element aside from general intent. As the state appears to concede, pursuant to the relevant 
authorities in Idaho, the answer must be yes. Therefore, this Court should reverse the conviction in 
the matter and remand for a new trial. 
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DATED this _" __ .J__ day of April, 2015. 
BY: 
OFFICE OF THE KOOTENAI 
COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
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Attorney General 
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- 8 -
[X] First Class Mail 
LJ Certified Mail 
LJ Facsimile (208) 854-8071 
[X] First Class Mail 

